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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
PARENT'S INDEMNITY CONTRACT VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
In the case of Valdimer v. Mt. Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc.,8 7 an infant
plaintiff, by her father, settled with defendant for personal injuries alleged to.
have resulted from defendant's negligence. At the time of payment, the
parent executed an instrument entitled "Parent-Guardian Release and Indemnity
Agreement" which purported to release the plaintiff's and the parents' claims
against the defendants. In addition, it contained an agreement that the parent
would hold defendant harmless by reason of any suit thereafter brought by or
on behalf of the infant.
One year after the agreement had been executed, the parent, as guardian
ad litem, commenced an action to recover damages for injuries to the infant
plaintiff and for his own incidental loss. Defendant denied negligence and
damage, set up the Statute of Limitations against the parent, pleaded the
previous payment as full discharge of the parents' claim, and pleaded that
payment as a partial defense against the infant plaintiff. The defendant also
counterclaimed against the parent on the basis of the indemnity agreement
Special Term granted plaintiff's motion to strike the partial defense and the
counterclaim from the answer. The Appellate Division,8 8 one judge dissenting,
modified the order by restoring the partial defense. The Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed the order as modified.
The decision in the instant case appears to be in accord with the legislative
policy responsible for Article 80 of the New York Civil Practice Act and is
consistent with previous judicial interpretation of Article 80.89
The primary issue is whether a contract valid on its face and made by
competent parties is to be declared void as against public policy. The desired
and probable ultimate effect of this indemnity agreement is to quiet the infant's
claim. This is so, because it is obvious that a parent will refuse to prosecute the
claim himself and will discourage its prosecution by the infant or anyone on his
behalf if that parent will be held responsible for the amount recovered. In
other words, an admittedly invalid release of the infant's claim would operate
as effectively as a valid release if the indemnity agreement is enforceable
against the parent. This would, be contrary to the legislature's intent in
enacting Article 80 of the Civil Practice Act, entitled "Proceeding for the
Settlement of an Infant's Claim." This article permits those interested in
settling claims with infants to have the settlement in all its aspects approved by a
court of competent jurisdiction without the necessity of starting a formal law
suit. 0 Article 80 is permissive only in that it eliminates the need for
commencing an action in order to get judicial approval of a settlement that will
87. Valdimer v. Mt. Vernon Hebrew Camps, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 21, 210 N.Y.S.2d 520
(1961).
88. 9 A.D.2d 900, 95 N.Y.S.2d 24 (2d Dep't 1959).
89. See Thirteenth Annual Report of N.Y. Judicial Council, 1947, pp. 193-202.
90. Gordon v. Agoronian, 10 Misc. 2d 650, 171 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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bind an infant. It is not permissive in the sense of allowing tortfeasors and
-others, against whom an infant may have a claim, to use it, or some alternative
device to obtain a binding settlement with that infant.
The lone dissenting judge of the Appellate Division expressed the opinion
that the decision in Delafield v. Barrett9 compelled them to hold the present
indemnity agreement enforceable against the parent. The Court of Appeals
discussed the Delafield case and concluded that it was not controlling. That case
involved an indemnity agreement designed to protect a brokerage firm from
liability for investing funds belonging to the indemnitor's wards in securities
that were not on the officially approved list.92 As a result of general market
declines in 1929, the infants' funds were lost. Their mother, the indemnitor,
brought suit on their behalf to recover their money from the brokerage firm.
The broker counterclaimed on the indemnity agreement, and it was held to be
valid. This case is distinguishable because the conduct with which the defendant
was charged in the Delafield case was not tortious as in the instant case and
because the indemnity agreement was not necessarily to the infants' detriment
but could have benefited them by producing a larger return on their funds. In
the Valdimer case, the indemnity agreement kept the infant from the custody
and protection of the courts which was patently to their disadvantage.93
The holding of the Valdimer case, that indemnity agreements executed by
parents in non-judicial infant tort claim settlements are invalid as against public
policy, will undoubtedly cast a heavier burden on the courts and insurance
companies. The Supreme Court of Oregon, deciding a similar case, reasoned
that the additional costs to insurance carriers would be offset by adjustment
of premium rates and the burden on the court system was amply justified by the
nature of the interests to be protected. 94
D. G.M.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON NEGLIGENCE CLAIM APPLICABLE
The case of Lorberblatt v. Gerst95 presented a question of the applicable
period of limitations for a personal injuries action. The plaintiff claimed that
his cause of action was either one created by statute or, in the alternative, one
91. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1320:
When application may be made: In any instance in which an infant may have a
claim for damages for personal injuries, injury to property, or breach of contract,
an application for approval of a compromise or settlement of such claim may be
made to any court or a judge of any court in which an action could have been
brought to recover the amount of the proposed settlement. No application shall be
made under this article if an action has been commenced on behalf of the infant
to recover such damages.
92. 270 N.Y. 43, 200 N.E. 67 (1936).
93. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 111.
Infants are the wards of the courts, and our rules of practice abound in provisions
of ancient origin designed to safeguard their legal rights.
Greenburg v. New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co., 210 N.Y. 505, 509, 104 N.E. 931,
934 (1914).
94. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800 (1960).
95. 10 N.Y.2d 244, 219 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1961).
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